Florida International University

FIU Digital Commons
Economics Research Working Paper Series

Department of Economics

8-4-2008

Discretionary Behavior and Racial Bias in Issuing
Tra±c Tickets: Theory and Evidence
Nejat Anbarci
Department of Economics, Florida International University

Jungmin Lee
Department of Economics, Florida International University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/economics_wps
Recommended Citation
Anbarci, Nejat and Lee, Jungmin, "Discretionary Behavior and Racial Bias in Issuing Tra±c Tickets: Theory and Evidence" (2008).
Economics Research Working Paper Series. 44.
https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/economics_wps/44

This work is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Economics at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Economics Research Working Paper Series by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
dcc@fiu.edu.

Discretionary Behavior and Racial Bias in Issuing
Traffic Tickets: Theory and Evidence
Nejat Anbarci and Jungmin Lee∗
May 27, 2008
Recently, police departments, legislators, media, and the public at large in the U.S. have increasingly been concerned about racial disparities in officers’ issuing traffic tickets. Ascertaining the
extent to which an observed disparity reflects racial bias is the crucial issue. First, we use a theoretical model which borrows features from the recent literature regarding racial bias in vehicle
searches. In our model, motorists, picking the speed to travel at, take into account the probability
of getting ticketed and the speed that the officer will cite, while officers maximize a benefit function
generically increasing in the speed of ticketed drivers; this benefit function, however, is general
enough to allow officers to give certain drivers a break by citing them at a lower speed than they
were traveling. Empirically, we exploit the existence of a massive accumulation of speeding tickets
at 10 m.p.h. over the speed limit to elicit officers’ discretionary behavior and leniency. Surprisingly,
about 30% of all ticketed drivers were cited for driving exactly at this particular speed. Using our
novel measure of officers’ leniency, we find that especially white and male officers are heavily engaged in discretionary behavior. We also find officers’ discretion is racially biased; minority officers
are less lenient to minority drivers. This is interesting in comparison with Antonovics and Knight
(forthcoming) who, using the same data set, found evidence on own-race preferences in vehicle
searches.
JEL classification numbers: J70, K42
Keywords: Discretionary behavior, strict behavior, leniency, racial bias, drivers’ speeding decision,
officers’ ticketing and citation decision.
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Introduction

Since the early 1990s, the national debate over racial profiling has mostly focused on countless
accounts of unjustified searches, videotaped beatings, and so on. The national attention as well
as numerous lawsuits brought about against police departments nationwide - alleging racially prejudiced and at times harsh law enforcement practices - have grown like an avalanche since. The
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resulting public outcry has later been recognized by politicians at the highest levels as well.1
In July 2003, Pulitzer Prize winning journalist Bill Dedman and his co-author, Francie Latour,
reported the initial results of an analysis of 166,000 tickets and warnings from every police department in Massachusetts over a two-month period, April and May of 2001. Comparing speeding
tickets and warnings, they drew serious conclusions such as minorities, men and young drivers were
least likely to receive a warning, and thus less likely to get away with speeding. In this paper,
using the same data set, we will take a closer look at these issues focusing on racial bias in issuing
speeding tickets.
It is small wonder that Dedman and Latour’s articles have attracted so much attention in
the short period of time since their initial appearance in the Boston Globe. First, the economic
impact of a traffic ticket is considerable. Speeding tickets in Massachusetts start at $75 including
$25 surcharge for the Head Injury Trust Fund; for the first ten miles above the speed limit, the
fine is $75, and then it rises by ten dollars for each additional mile. But that typically is the
least of the problems. The Boston Globe estimates that a typical Massachusetts driver will pay
$350 in higher insurance premiums for a single ticket and $1400 for two tickets, over the six
years a ticket stays on the driving record. Second, while its monetary costs are explicit and
recognizable by everyone, disparate treatment of different races, ethnicities and genders has other
serious implications: Individuals subjected to disparate traffic enforcement may in time experience
a loss of respect and trust in their local police force.
Our main contribution in this paper is that we investigate police discretion especially regarding
reported speeds on issued citations. Police discretion goes beyond deciding whether to ticket a
speeding driver or just let drivers go with or without oral warnings. It also includes cases where
the officers give them a “break” - and a smaller fine - by citing them at a lower speed than they
were traveling. One of this paper’s most important contributions will be identifying a measure
of police discretion in terms of officers’ underreporting especially at a particular lower speed very
often. Indeed Figure 1, the histogram of reported speeds in our sample, shows that reported speeds
are likely to be different from drivers’ actual speeds.2 There are outstanding spikes in some specific
levels of speed, such as 10 and 15 m.p.h. over the speed limit. We will exploit this unique empirical
1

On June 1999, President Clinton condemned racial profiling as “morally indefensible,” and described it as “the
opposite of good police work where actions are based on hard facts, not stereotypes.” Finally, on June 18, 2003, the
Bush administration ordered a broad ban on racial and ethnic profiling at all 70 federal law enforcement agencies.
2
We will discuss Figure 1 in more detail in Section 5. In the process of providing us with the data, Bill Dedman
was quick to notice and point out this curious nature of the citation distribution as well - in particular the huge heap
of citations exactly at the speed of 10 m.p.h. over the limit.
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feature to elicit officers’ discretionary behavior and leniency.3
Discretion - at least for our purposes - is broadly defined as “latitude of choice within certain
bounds imposed by law” (Merriam-Webster, 1996). A discretionary behavior by an officer may
prevent him from reporting the actual speed of the driver for various plausible concerns. Strict
behavior, in contrast, implies that the officer tickets all speeding drivers at the exact speed they
drive. As one can easily predict, various factors such as drivers’ age and financial situation - as
much as the latter can be judged by officers - as well as the current high levels of the fines may play
significant roles in officers’ discretion. In this paper, while we look at the above issues, we examine
particularly whether officers’ discretionary behavior reflects their racial bias.
Our simple theoretical model borrows features from the recent literature regarding racial bias
in police stops and searches (such as Knowles, Persico and Todd, 2001, and Antonovics and Knight,
forthcoming; AK hereafter); in addition, our model incorporates several stylized facts pertaining
to the institutional details in Massachusetts and to officers’ and drivers’ incentives. In our model,
motorists, picking the speed to travel at, take into account the probability of getting ticketed as
well as the speed that the officer will cite in deciding at what speed they will travel, while officers
- net of the cost of ticketing motorists - maximize a benefit function generically increasing in the
speed of ticketed drivers; this benefit function is then generalized to allow officers to give some
drivers a break by citing them at a lower speed than they were traveling.4 We then obtain results
on discretionary behavior and differential bias among different races within different subgroups of
the police.
Empirically, we examine the citation-officer matched data from the Boston Police Department
between April 2001 and November 2002. As illustrated by the above histogram, we find that
officers exhibit significant degrees of discretionary behavior. We verify that this discretionary
behavior indeed indicates a major form of leniency by officers – underreporting. We find that white
officers are the most lenient ones overall, followed by Hispanic and African-American officers, in
terms of speed-discounting leniency. Female officers are relatively stricter than male officers. We
3

The following anecdote seems to support our empirical strategy. “There are always mitigating circumstances
in a stop,” Officer Knecht said in an interview with the Boston Globe. “Anything could be said or could happen.
Attitudes, people talking back to you. The circumstances change with each individual driver. But for most cops I
know, race has nothing to do with it.” He recalled that he did indeed show leniency to at least one African-American
motorist on that day. “Although he wrote the man a ticket for only 10 m.p.h. over the 35 m.p.h. limit, he made a
note in the top right-hand corner of the ticket: ‘64’.” That meant that the driver was actually going 64 m.p.h., or 29
m.p.h. over the limit. Admittedly, Knecht would sometimes lower the speed on a ticket, to save a driver a high fine,
and the notation was there in case the driver challenged the ticket in court.
4
Another distinct source of discretionary behavior which is quite innocuous is to set cutoff speed levels in stopping
drivers.
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do not find evidence of systematic racial bias in the form of ‘mutual or reciprocal’ (e.g., white
officers discriminating against Hispanic motorists, and in turn, Hispanic officers discriminating
against white drivers) or ‘monolithic’ (e.g., all officers discriminating against African-American
officers) racial bias. However, we find strong evidence that minority officers are less lenient to
minority drivers. Interestingly, there is no such minority-on-minority bias in the case of female
drivers or new-vehicle drivers. Our results, to a large extent, echo Dedman and Latour’s findings
about officers’ discretionary behavior in issuing warnings.5 There are also differences in how officers
treat in-town vs. out-of-town motorists, and commercial vs. non-commercial motorists. Finally,
we find that the degrees and forms of racial bias depend on its surroundings; there are significant
variations in terms of time of the day as well as different neighborhoods. This conclusion calls for
more empirical studies on racial bias across different contexts.
This paper is organized as follows. Next section summarizes the Related Literature. We then
present the Theoretical Setup, which is followed by a section on the Empirical Predictions of the
Theoretical Setup. Sections 5 and 6 are on Data and Empirical Strategy, respectively. In Section
7, we present our Empirical Findings, and finally Section 8 concludes.
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Related Literature

Our work is related to two interrelated strands of recent research. The first strand concerns officers’
decision-making regarding whether they issue tickets or warnings to a driver with certain characteristics. The main question is whether the decision-making is affected by the racial preferences
of officers. The results are mixed. The state-sponsored Northeastern Study, conducted by criminologists Farrell and McDevitt (2004), used the same Massachusetts data set as that of Dedman
and Latour.6 Their general results reveal major disparities in ticketing behavior of officers as manifested by the distribution of tickets and warnings officers issued at different speeds to motorists of
different races.7
5

We also report results regarding warnings.
The Northeastern study employs the standard benchmark test which has been traditionally used in the early
literature studying racial bias in police stops and searches as well. This test compares the shares of racial minorities
in the population to their shares in the sample of drivers ticketed (or stopped and searched by the police in the
police search literature). In the use of this test, it is not clear what would be the right benchmark to compare the
traffic citations. Ideally, it should be the racial composition of drivers on the road, but such information is typically
unavailable.
7
This naturally raises a red flag regarding the officers’ intentions given that an early study by Lamberth (1996),
who examined driving habits of African-American and white motorists on Maryland highways, found no difference
in the rate at which these two segments of motorists engaged in speeding.
6

4

McConnell and Scheidegger (2001) compared tickets issued by air-patrol officers with citations
issued by ground-patrol officers in order to overcome the traditional benchmark test’s limitation.
This is indeed a “blind” vs. “not-blind” comparison since the race of the driver is hard to be
determined by the air-patrol officer. They found, surprisingly, that a smaller proportion of AfricanAmericans received ground-patrol citations than air-patrol citations. Ridgeway (2006) studied the
7,607 stops recorded by the Oakland Police Department in 2003.

Using the propensity-score

matching method, he found that “black drivers are significantly less likely to be cited than nonblack drivers, black drivers are slightly less likely to be cited than white drivers, and white and
non-white drivers are not cited at significantly different rates” (p. 19).
Some studies also looked at other types of discretionary behavior. The above-mentioned Northeastern Study examined gender preferences of officers. Similarly, Blalock, DeVaro, Leventhal, and
Simon (2007) compared the data from Bloomington and Highland Park in Illinois, Wichita, Boston,
and the entire state of Tennessee and found out that female drivers are more likely to receive citations in three of the five locations, while male drivers are more likely to receive citations in the other
two locations. Makowsky and Stratmann (forthcoming) took a different perspective and examined
the political-economy determinants of speeding tickets and traffic fines. Using the first-two-month
Massachusetts data excluding Boston, they found evidence that when local police officers issue
tickets, they pursue additional objectives as well - apart from strict law enforcement -, such as
maximizing their own utility and raising local government revenues from out-of-towners. Their
paper is in the same spirit with and complementary to our paper in that both papers focus on
police officers’ discretionary behavior in issuing speeding tickets.
The second strand that our paper is related to is the quickly-growing literature on racial profiling in traffic stops and searches. Economists have recently joined the debate which was initially
dominated by criminologists and statisticians employing the benchmark test. The interest of criminologists and statisticians in the subject started shortly after the 1993 civil case involving an
African-American attorney, Robert L. Wilkins, as the plaintiff, who alleged that the Maryland
State Police stopped and searched him simply because of his ethnicity. As a result of a consent
decree, a researcher, John Lamberth, conducted extensive research as a part of criminal prosecution
on Maryland highways; he later conducted similar research on New Jersey Turnpike. In both cases,
he found major racial disparities in traffic stops and searches; his latter results were reported in
State of New Jersey vs. Soto (1996). Later, Harris (1999) conducted interviews with motorists who
were stopped, examined official records collected by several large departments in Ohio, and found
5

similar results. More recently, Novak (2004) reported that, although disproportionate number of
minorities is stopped and searched by the Kansas police, they are more likely to be stopped at
night and to reside outside the city.
Grogger and Ridgeway (2006), on the other hand, had a different conclusion by examining
the differences in stops when police are unable to observe the drivers’ race at night versus in the
presence of daylight. Using the data from Oakland, California, they find that African-American
drivers are more likely to be stopped when it is dark outside and officers cannot easily observe the
motorist’s race. Consequently, they are unable to reject the null hypothesis of no racial profiling.
A number of recent papers in economics have attempted to determine whether the observed
racial disparities in policing patterns can be explained better by models of statistical discrimination
or by models of preference-based discrimination. In Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001), police decide
which vehicles to search and motorists decide whether to carry contraband such as drugs or illegal
weapons. Officers who are not racially biased maximize the number of successful searches, defined
as uncovering contraband, net of conducting the cost of a search.8 Racial bias is incorporated in
the model as a reduction in the perceived cost of searching vehicles of certain types of motorists.
Biased monitoring implies that the equilibrium rate at which contraband is seized (the “hit rate”)
is lower for the groups subject to bias. Using vehicle search data from Maryland, they found that
the hit rates are indeed equalized across races.
Three other particularly relevant papers in that literature are Dharmapala and Ross (2004),
Anwar and Fang (2006), and AK (forthcoming). Although they have their modeling differences,
the first two papers assume that it is infeasible for the police to deter crime in a given subgroup
of the population perfectly; given this assumption, they in turn show that the hit rate test is not
necessarily valid. In addition, Anwar and Fang (2006) provide a test for “differential bias” within
different subgroups of the police. Using the Florida State Highway Patrol data, they cannot reject
the hypothesis of no differential bias. AK (forthcoming), whose analysis is similar in spirit to that
of Anwar and Fang (2006), use the same Boston data we use in this paper; they find that officers
are more likely to conduct a search if the race of the officer differs from the race of the driver. It
is interesting to note that the same data show different types of racial bias; they find own-race
preferences or racial bias against different races, while we find minority-on-minority racial bias.
8
For in-depth discussion regarding the objective of police vehicle search, refer to Dominitz and Knowles (2006)
and Close and Mason (2007). In addition, Close and Mason (2007), using the same data from the Florida State
Highway Patrol used by Anwar and Fang (2006), compared consent versus non-consent searches and examined search
rationale given by officers.

6

Our paper is in line with the latter two papers in that we focus on differential bias.
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Theoretical Setup

3.1

Equilibrium without Underreporting and Racial Preferences

Suppose an officer is in charge of a particular segment of a route at a certain time of the day. We
first consider the case of officers who neither have any racial preference nor engage in underreporting
- the latter implies that, when these officers choose to ticket a speeding driver,9 they report the
actual speed of a driver.
Let c denote all characteristics of a motorist other than race that may affect the decision of the
police officer as to whether to issue a traffic citation (interchangeably, ticket) or not. The variable
c may be unobserved or only partially observed by third parties (including the econometrician). As
in the racial bias literature, here too the variable c will be treated as a one-dimensional variable.
Likewise, let C denote all characteristics of an officer other than race that may affect his decision as
to whether to issue a traffic citation or not. The variable C too may be unobserved or only partially
observed by third parties (including the econometrician) and will be treated as a one-dimensional
variable. Experience and gender are among notable officer characteristics.
Officers compare the marginal cost and marginal benefit of issuing a ticket to a motorist who
is traveling at speed S. Let b(S, c|C) > 0 denote the benefit function of an officer of type (C) from
citing a driver of type (c) at their actual speed10 S > S, where S > 0 is the speed limit on the
portion of the road at which the driver was stopped.
Let S̃(c) > 0 denote the maximum speed a driver of type (c) may technically and safely find
desirable in the absence of any fines. Let s̃(c) ≡ S̃(c) − S (and s ≡ S − S). Observe that this
re-scaling will allow us to measure every relevant speed level relative to the speed limit. To avoid
trivial cases, we will assume that s̃(c) for type (c) is high enough to accommodate real-life speeds
(such as the ones, as data indicate, that can exceed the speed limit by more than 40-50 miles at
times).
9
Issuing warnings and not stopping a speeding driver are all equivalent in the eyes of the driver in terms of avoiding
a hefty cost regardless of the particular action taken by officers.
10
Although a driver may have an optimal speed in mind, it may be difficult to maintain that speed consistently;
even when it is possible, a strict officer’s radar gun as well may record it at a different speed level due to the inherent
margin of error such electronic devices have. Thus, there is some degree of randomness involved regarding the speed
of a driver. We will, however, deliberately abstract away from this aspect in our theoretical model in order not to
complicate things further by incorporating motorists’ risk preferences. As we will explain later, the randomness in
fact strengthens our empirical findings.
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Let s̃ ≡ max s̃(c) over all driver types (c). We normalize the officer’s benefit of a traffic ticket
issued at that speed, b(s̃, c|C), to equal one, so that the marginal cost of writing a ticket (or of
stopping a driver - which we will consider in the Appendix) is scaled as a fraction of a well-defined
maximum possible benefit to a police officer. For an officer, the marginal cost of writing a ticket
to any motorist is denoted by t where 0 < t < 1. Given the officer’s cost of issuing a ticket to a
driver and given the benefit function, we can define a strict officer : a strict officer of type (C) has
b(s, c|C) > t for any given s, c, and t; thus either b(s, c|C) is very high for any s > 0 or t is very
low or both. Whenever on duty, a strict officer will stop any speeding driver on the route he is in
charge of, and report the actual speed the motorist was traveling at.
The probability of a ticket a driver of type (c) will receive while traveling at speed s will be
denoted by γ(s, c|C) (where 0 ≤ γ(s, c|C) ≤ 1). Since any particular route may not be policed
all the time, γ(s, c|C) may be zero sometimes during a given day, and very low on certain days if
police enforcement is absent for prolonged periods of time on specific days. Let z > 0 denote this
probability that an officer will be present on a certain route at a given time. A motorist will take
this probability into consideration and will consider z · γ(s, c|C) as the ticketing probability she
faces.
Unlike the officers who encounter different driver types, many times every day, a motorist may
hardly encounter different officer types every day or even every month. Therefore, a motorist’s
conjecture regarding the value of γ(s, c|C) is first based on her observation of the frequency of
stopped cars by police officers on her usual route on different days and times. Although the
motorist may not be able to distinguish between the cases whether an officer is writing a ticket or a
warning (or will be letting the stopped driver go with only an oral warning), such observations and
the information that she gathers from other sources are her most important sources in reaching a
conjecture on the value of γ(s, c|C). Let f (C) be the distribution of C in the officer population on
R
that route. Let Eγ ≡ γ(s, c|C)f (C)dC denote the expectation of the driver of type (c) regarding
γ(s, c|C).
The penalty function is denoted by p(s|c) > 0. In Massachusetts, as mentioned before, for
the first ten miles above the speed limit, the fine is $75, and then it rises by ten dollars for each
additional mile. But the major hit typically comes with the car insurance bill. As the Boston
Globe has estimated, a Massachusetts driver will pay $350 in higher insurance premia for a single
ticket (and $1,400 altogether for two tickets - in that sense as well, the penalty function depends
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on c), over the six years it stays on the driving record. Thus, the penalty function takes the form:
p(s|c) = α

for 0 < s ≤ 10

p(s|c) = α + 10 · (s − 10)

(1)

for 10 < s

where α > 0 denotes the initial speeding fine $75 plus the present discounted value of the $350
insurance premium because of the first speeding ticket (or $1,400 with a second ticket - and even
more with yet another one) the driver will incur over the next six years.
For a driver of type (c), the function v(s, c) will measure the variable benefit from speeding (such
as arriving at a particular destination earlier, the pure joy of driving at a particular high speed, and
so on), net of safety and gas mileage concerns. These variable benefits will be wiped out if there is
a 100% ticketing probability that the driver faces at some speed; that is, this variable part of the
benefit function will affect a driver’s utility more as the ticketing probability decreases. Thus, it
is reasonable to presume that a motorist’s utility function has a non-negative fixed benefit portion
that the driver does not lose even after getting ticketed with 100% probability. Let D ≥ 0 denote
this fixed benefit in the motorist’s utility function, unaffected by ticketing probability she faces.
Putting everything together, the utility function of driver of type (c), will have the canonical form
(a somewhat similar version of which is also used in the police stop-and-search literature):
u(s, c, z, γ) = D + (1 − z)v(s, c) + z(1 − Eγ)v(s, c) − zEγp(s|c)

(2)

⇔ u(s, c, z, γ) = D + (1 − zEγ) · v(s, c) − zEγp(s|c)
A driver will maintain a speed s∗ at which her expected utility is maximized. Any realistic variable
benefit function should comply with the fact that many drivers find it optimal to drive beyond the
speed limit as well as to speed more than ten miles above that limit. This implies the presence
of certain types of variable benefit functions.11 Further, given some parameter values, any such
function should generate an optimal natural maximum speed in the absence of any fines (“natural”
due to safety and technical reasons, as mentioned above). For that to happen, the variable benefit
function should also exhibit a declining range of marginal benefit at very high speeds and eventually
reach a value of zero at s∗ = s̃(c).
The simplest functional form that exhibits all of these properties is the quadratic form. Observe
that the variable benefit function below exhibits increasing benefit in some range of speeds exceeding
11

In the Appendix, we show that some simple linear functional forms - such as v(s, c) = a0 and v(s, c) = a0 + a1 · s
- should not be considered due to that concern.
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the limit by 10 m.p.h. and declining benefit at some higher speeds (eventually reaching the peak
at s∗ = s̃(c), at least for some coefficient values). Let a0 ≥ 0 and a1 , a2 > 0:
v(s, c) = a0 + a1 · s̃(c) · s − a2 · s2

for s ≤ s̃(c)

(3)

The marginal benefit of speeding with this functional form is positive first and becomes negative
for higher s. We will use the functional form above as the canonical form of a driver’s variable
benefit function with type (c). First, observe that, in order for a driver to speed above the limit,
u(s, c, z, γ) = D + (1 − zEγ)v(s, c) − zEγp(s|c) > 0 must hold. That is, if u(s, c, z, γ) < 0, the
driver will not speed. If u(s, c, z, γ) = 0, the driver will be indifferent between speeding and not
speeding.
Given Equations (1), (2) and (3), the optimizing behavior yields, for the driver of type (c), the
optimal s∗ miles per hour above the speed limit as follows:
1
s (c, z, Eγ) =
2a2
∗

µ
a1 s̃(c) − p0

zEγ
(1 − zEγ)

¶
≡ arg max u().

(4)

where p0 denote dp(s|c)/ds, which is 0 if s∗ < 10 and 10 if s∗ ≥ 10. Observe that s∗ decreases in
both Eγ and z. In addition, for s̃(c) to be the maximum speed, a1 = 2a2 must hold. Note that
there is no restriction for the range of s∗ except s∗ ≤ s̃(c). Given the undifferentiable structure of
the penalty function, one may erroneously expect s∗ (c, z, γ) to be either zero or greater than 10.
The following figure, however, illustrates that 0 < s∗ (c, z, γ) ≤ 10 is possible as well since s∗ (c, z, γ)
can reach a maximum in that range.
An officer makes two main types of decisions: the stopping decision and the ticketing decision.
The stopping decision (which is not fully observable to the econometrician) is rather complicated
- and to some extent non-crucial to our analysis; a full-fledged version of it (incorporating underreporting and racial preferences) will take place in the Appendix.
Suppose the officer chooses to stop a driver who is traveling at speed s; upon stopping the
driver, the officer can find out about (c). Then an officer of type (C) will obtain the following net
benefit from ticketing that driver
b(s, c|C) − t

(5)

Equation (5) implies the following. If b(s, c|C) − t < 0, then the optimizing behavior implies
γ(s, c|C) = 0; that is, the officer’s best response is to never ticket motorist type (c), who speeds
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at s. If b(s, c|C) − t > 0, then the officer will be willing to issue a ticket to type (c); that is, the
officer’s best response is to always ticket motorist type c who speeds at s. If b(s, c|C) − t = 0, then
the officer will be willing to randomize over whether to issue a ticket to type c, who speeds at s or
not ticketing the motorist at all.
Thus, for motorists of type (c), and officers of type (C), there is a unique equilibrium of this
discretionary interaction (i.e., game) in which (1) drivers’ correct conjecture regarding the expected
ticketing probability of an officer, zEγ, on a given route and the penalty function, p(s|c) > 0, renders
motorists of type (c) driving on that route to choose a particular best response speed level, and
(2) the behavior of motorists of type (c) and an officer type (C)’s maximum benefit associated
with each (s, c|C) render the officer indifferent between ticketing them after stopping them at some
speed level (i.e., such an officer will surely be willing to ticket them beyond that speed level and
not willing to ticket them below).
Figure 3a graphs the canonical best response functions for motorists and officers when s∗ ≥ 10.
Then the step function represents the best response function of the officer on that route and
the downward-sloping curve represents the best response function of motorists type (c) given the
expectation about the officer’s type. Recall that z denotes the probability that the officer will
be present on that certain route at any given time that the driver travels. Figure 3b depicts the
equilibrium in which the driver takes into consideration the expected value of the two different types
of officers’ ticketing best response functions (high cutoff speed, ‘high s∗ ’, and low cutoff speed, ‘low
s∗ ’). Taking that expected value into consideration, the driver’s equilibrium speed is such that she
would be ticketed by the stricter officer type while she would not be ticketed by the more lenient
officer type.

3.2

Equilibrium with Underreporting and Racial Preferences

Let r ∈ {a, w} denote a driver’s race, and let R ∈ {A, W } denote an officer’s race which are
observable by both parties upon meeting each other in person. Let f (C|W ) and f (C|A) be the
distribution of C in the white and African-American officer populations on that route, respectively.
Let g(R) > 0 be the probability that the officer on the route the driver is traveling is of race R.
¢
P ¡R
(γ(s, c, r|C, R)f (C|R)dC g(R) denote the expectation
Then, in this subsection, let Eγ ≡
A,W

of the driver of type (c, r) regarding the different ticketing probabilities,γ(s, c, r|C, R), by different
officer types (C, R).
Underreporting is such that the officer cites a driver of type (c, r) at speed σ < s; if σ = 0,
11

observe that the motorist is not ticketed.12 Let bR
r (σ, s, c|C) ∈ (0.1] denote the benefit function of
an officer of type (C, R) from citing an additional driver of type (c, r) at speed σ, who was actually
traveling at speed s.
There may be some drivers with type (c, r) assessed more favorably by some officer of type (C,
R) - e.g., polite, old, quite, female - and some other characteristics assessed less favorably by him
- e.g., rude, young, talking-back, male; likewise, non-minorities may be assessed more favorably
than minorities. It is reasonable to think that such an officer will report a speed σ ∗ < s in the
former cases, and a speed σ ∗ = s in the latter cases. Nevertheless, we will assume that σ will be
non-decreasing in the actual speed s.
With underreporting, the penalty function takes the form:
p(σ|c) = α

for 0 < σ ≤ 10

p(σ|c) = α + 10(σ − 10)
Then let Eσ =

P ¡R

(1’)

for 10 < σ

¢
(σ(s|c, r, C, R)f (C|R)dC g(R) denote the expectation of the driver of type

A,W

(c, r) regarding different underreporting possibilities,σ(s|c, r, C, R), by different officer types (C, R).
With underreporting and the different races of drivers, the driver of type (c, r)’s utility function
will take the above penalty function into consideration:
ur (s, c, r, z, σ, γ) = D + (1 − zEγ)vr (s, c, r) − zEγp(Eσ)

(2’)

The variable benefit function of a driver type (c, r) is given by
vr (s, c) = a0 + a1 s̃(c, r)s − a2 s2

for s ≤ s̃(c, r)

(3’)

Since σ is assumed to be non-decreasing in the actual speed s that is clocked by the officer up
to certain speed level and increasing at or beyond that, it implies that the driver also knows that
dp(Eσ)/ds = k ≥ 0 up to some relatively high speed level and dp(Eσ)/ds = k > 0 at or beyond
that speed level.
Given Equations (1’), (2’) and (3’), the optimizing behavior of the driver of type (c, r) yields
12
For some obvious reasons for officers such as reputation concerns and court-time loss, we rule out overreporting
as a theoretical possibility. We will check the validity of this assumption in Section 7.4.
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speeding s∗r miles above the speed limit as follows:
s∗r (c, z, γ) =

1
2a2

µ
a1 s̃(c, r) − k

zEγ
(1 − zEγ)

¶
.

(4’)

Figure 4a depicts the driver’s best response function based on the expectation of reported speed
when the driver is stopped and ticketed. Similar to Figure 3b, Figure 4b depicts the equilibrium
in which the driver takes into consideration the expected value of the two different types of officers
(high σ and low σ). When the driver believes that the officer will favor him (and cite at low σ),
the driver will speed faster given a value of Eγ.
We assume that an officer of race (R)’s cost of writing a ticket to a driver of race (r) has
an additional component: tR
r is the additional cost of underreporting one additional mile, where
0 < tR
r < 1; that is, if she drives at speed s and the officer decides to underreport the speed at σ < s,
then the “integrity cost” of underreporting is tR
r (s−σ)/s; if the officer has no racial preferences, then
regardless of different driver races, the officer has the same tR . Suppose the officer chooses to stop a
driver. Then the officer of type (C, R), will choose the probability of ticketing, γ R (σ, s, c, r|C), each
motorist of type (c, r) at speed σ, who is actually driving at speed s, by considering the following
net benefit from ticketing that driver13
µ
bR
r (σ, s, c|C)

−

tR
r

s−σ
s

¶
−t

(5’)

¡
¢
0
Let b0 denote d bR
r (σ, s, c|C) /dσ; i.e., b is the marginal benefit of reporting one more mile.
The officer will determine his optimal underreporting level, if any, by equating
±
b0 = −tR
r s.
Figure 5a depicts a benefit function regarding a favorite driver type (c, r) which reaches a
maximum below the actual speed of the driver. In Figure 5b, we observe a benefit regarding a
non-favorite driver type (c, r) which reaches a maximum at the actual speed of the driver. The two
different levels of marginal costs imply the same level of citation, σ = s.
After the officer figures out the optimal citation, σ ∗ ≤ s, he will next figure out whether to
¡
¢
∗
R s−σ ∗ − t < 0, then the optimizing
ticket the driver at that cited speed or not. If bR
r (σ , s, c|C) − tr
s
behavior implies γ = 0; that is, the officer’s best response is to never ticket motorist type (c, r) who
13

There is also the issue of discounting a fine, although there is an explicit formula for the dollar amount set by
state law. We will examine this issue in Section 7.6.
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∗
R
speeds at s. If bR
r (σ , s, c|C) − tr

¡ s−σ∗ ¢
s

− t > 0, then the officer will be willing to issue a ticket to

type (c, r); that is, the officer’s best response is to always ticket motorist type (c, r) who speeds at
¡
¢
∗
R s−σ ∗ − t = 0, then the officer will be willing to randomize over whether
s. If bR
r (σ , s, c|C) − tr
s
to issue a ticket to type (c, r), who speeds at s or not ticketing the motorist at all.
Thus, for motorists of type (c, r) and officer type (C, R), there is a unique equilibrium of this
discretionary interaction in which (1) an officer of type (C, R), given his maximum benefit associated
with each (σ, s, c, r), decides on the optimal speed he will cite, σ ∗ ≤ s, (2) drivers’ correct conjecture
regarding the expected ticketing probability of officers, zEγ, on a given route and the expected cited
speed render motorists of different types driving on that route to choose particular best response
speed levels, and (3) the behavior of motorists and an officer’s maximum benefit associated with
each (σ, s, c, r) render the officer indifferent between ticketing them after stopping them at some
speed level.14

4

Empirical Implications of the Theoretical Setup

An important goal of an officer, who underreports the speed of a driver with a favorable type (c or
r or both), is that the driver faces a smaller penalty than her actual speed would imply. Suppose
that there are two segments of drivers. Both segments take the penalty function (which depends
on σ) into consideration, which leads to a higher speeding best-response for the segment (with
characteristic (c)) that is favored by the officer up to the particular high speed beyond which the
officer does not show any leniency to any type of drivers. Let (c0 ) denote the characteristic of
the other segment that is not favored by the officer. Then, in Figure 6, the officer’s best-response
ticketing probability step functions intersect the best-response functions of the (c) and (c0 ) segments
of drivers at two different levels of speed, e.g. s = 11 for type (c) and s0 = 14 for type (c0 ). But
suppose the case in which the (c) type’s speed is cited as σ = 0 (i.e., the driver is let go with an
oral warning) while the (c0 ) type’s speed is cited as σ = 14.
Consider another officer with somewhat similar benefit functions but with different ticketing
costs such that his step functions intersect those best-response functions of two segments of drivers
at speeds, for instance, s = 12 and s0 = 15, and yet another officer at speeds, s = 13 and s0 = 16;
suppose that in both of these cases, the (c) type is cited at speed σ = 10 while the (c0 ) type is
cited at her actual speed. Then there will be one citation each at σ = 14, σ = 15, σ = 16, two
14

The Appendix considers various further generalizations our theoretical model, including the incorporation of the
officers’ stopping decision.
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citations at σ = 10, and one warning. As we add more such officers, their discretionary behavior
will imply a rather disproportionate number of citations at σ = 10.15 This example clearly shows
that underreporting is one plausible cause for massive spikes on speed dispersion like Figure 1.16
Now suppose a certain race of officers (or perhaps a couple of races of officers) have the following
racial preferences: r Â r0 . Then race (r) motorists will obtain disproportionately more citations
at σ = 10 and warnings (and, compensatingly, relatively fewer citations at nearby higher speeds)
from these officers, and that situation will be the least for race (r0 ) motorists. Thus, discretionary
behavior and racial bias by such officers lead to a disproportionate number of citations by these
officers at a focal level of speed, such as σ = 10, and warnings. In other words, such disproportionate
number of citations at a particular level of speed will readily indicate the presence of discretionary
behavior or racial bias by some segments of officers. Therefore, average officer characteristics at
the prominent speed are more likely to reflect observable characteristics of discretionary officers.
Similarly, drivers who were cited at the speed are more likely to have some favorable characteristics
(and they actually drove faster). Finally, we should observe more favorable combinations of officers’
and drivers’ characteristics at the prominent speed level.
Also, the “integrity marginal cost” parameter, tR
r , of an officer can presumably be even higher
in a neighborhood more populated with people of his own race. Then, officers can be expected to
be stricter in such neighborhoods. Further, with the help of some stylized facts regarding which
segments of drivers are more likely to be on the roads on certain days and times, we can make
predictions regarding ‘day of the week’ and ‘time of the day’ as well. For example, on Sundays,
the prevalence of elderly churchgoers may elicit more lenient behavior from officers in terms of
underreporting. Likewise, at night, even their preferred-race drivers may be perceived less favorably
by officers.
Lastly, but not leastly, our model shows the importance of controlling for actual speed when we
compare the ticketing probability between two segments of drivers. If actual speed is unobservable
or omitted, comparing the ticketing probability might as well be misleading because it is possible to
find, like Figure 6, that favored drivers are more likely to be ticketed than non-favored drivers since
favored drivers are on average more likely to speed. This omitted-variable problem is troublesome
15

Albers and Albers (1983 noted that certain numbers and fractions are more prominent than others - such as
round numbers and percentages. We do not attempt to explain why 10 is a prominent number in our context.
16
Another possible cause is the kinked penalty function at 10 m.p.h. over the limit, which leads some drivers to
choose that exact speed rather than its adjacent speeds. However, first of all, this does not explain the spikes at
other speed levels. Also, since the kinked-penalty-function explanation totally depends on drivers’ heterogeneity, we
can distinguish this hypothesis and our discretionary-behavior hypothesis by testing whether tickets cited at those
focal speed levels are related to certain characteristics matching between officers and drivers.
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since reported speed is likely to be different from actual speed even when information on speed is
available in the data.

5

Data

The main data set we use in this paper is based on the record of 2,001,562 traffic citations issued in
Massachusetts between April 2001 and November 2002. The data set contains basic demographic
information about drivers, such as race, gender, age, and home town. Our data also contain
information on time and date when citation was issued as well as the neighborhood in which the
motorist’s vehicle was stopped. We are able to match the citation-level data with the officer-level
data including individual officers’ race, gender, and experience on the force. The officer-level data
are available only for the Boston police department. All officers in our sample are, therefore,
municipal police officers. There are 161,133 officer-citation matched citations issued by Boston
police officers within Boston.
Because of the particular focus of our paper, we only consider speeding tickets and warnings.
They account for 25.7% of all issued citations, the largest portion as any single category. Most
citations in our sample are tickets because warnings were recorded for the first two months only,
April and May in 2001, and then stopped being collected due to budgetary shortfalls. We deleted
citations with missing information regarding any variable that we will use for our regression analysis;
in particular, there are 2,041 citations without speed and 3,128 citations without drivers’ race. To
be comparable to the previous literature on vehicle searches, we focus on three races, white, AfricanAmerican, and Hispanic. We deleted 1,875 citations where drivers are not white, African-American,
or Hispanic and 1,031 citations issued by Asian officers. Consequently, the final sample consists of
25,738 tickets and 2,644 warnings. Table 1 presents sample selection criteria.

5.1

Histogram of Tickets

Recall that Figure 1 graphs the frequency histogram of vehicle speed in miles per hour over the
posted speed limit as written on tickets, as denoted by σ in our theory section. Two notable
features stand out. First, there exist sizable spikes at multiples of 5 m.p.h. above the limit and,
more distinctly, a massive one at the speed of 10 m.p.h. above the limit. Given the size of the
spikes, it does not seem likely to explain their presence mainly by drivers’ heterogeneity, needless
to say that it would be hard to believe that drivers can control their speed so delicately particularly
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considering the city traffic conditions in Boston.
The more likely possibility is that the spikes result from officers’ discretionary reporting behavior. There are two possible explanations, which are not necessarily mutually exclusive: first, as
the stopping decision - captured by Equation (A5) in the Appendix - implies, officers can set their
speed gun to beep at those specific speeds. However, such a stopping decision can only provide a
partial explanation for those spikes. Suppose that an officer sets 10 m.p.h. above the limit as the
stopping threshold. Then he will not stop the motorists driving under 10 m.p.h. above the limit,
which can explain as to why the histogram abruptly drops below 10 m.p.h. above the limit.
The second, and more comprehensive explanation lies in the ticketing decision of officers captured by Equation (5’) in the theory section -, that entails officers having leeway to give a break
to certain types of drivers. When officers decide to give a motorist a break, they can do so by
letting that motorist go without ticket or by reporting a lower speed. It is still hard to explain why
officers prefer those distinct numbers just on the basis of the ticketing decision analysis provided
by Equation (5’). But for various other reasons (such as officer using ‘prominence levels’ as well
as officers ‘not wanting to look too meticulous’), it may seem reasonable to imagine that once an
officer decides to give a break to a driver who drove - somewhat but not much - over 10 m.p.h.
above the limit, say, 16 m.p.h. above the limit, the officer would choose 10 rather than 9 or 11
m.p.h. above the limit. Nevertheless, these spikes, particularly the massive one at 10, will play a
crucial role in our empirical identification in this paper.
Recall that Figure 3.a illustrates the equilibrium speed (s∗ ≥ 10) and ticketing probability for
a given type of drivers and a given type of officers when there is neither underreporting nor racial
bias. It is possible to derive equilibrium speed dispersion by allowing the ticketing cost, t, to vary
across individual officers. There will be a spike, for example, at 10 m.p.h. over the limit if and only
if the distribution of t also has a corresponding spike exactly at t = b(10, c|C). In this case, if the
officer’s benefit function is continuous, drivers cited at immediately higher speeds (e.g. 11 m.p.h.
over the limit) should be similar in characteristics with those cited at 10 m.p.h. over the limit since
the spike results from officers’ heterogeneity. This is a testable hypothesis. On the other hand, if
we introduce the possibility of underreporting, it is not necessary for us to assume an unusual and
unlikely distribution of t in order to explain the spike in the distribution of reported speed. Instead
it is possible that, as shown in Figure 4, favored drivers who are stopped at higher speeds are cited
at the speed of the spike (i.e. 10 m.p.h. over the limit). Since there are non-favored drivers who
were actually traveling at 10 m.p.h. over the limit and were ticketed and cited at that speed, we
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should find a mix of favored and non-favored speeders. However, those drivers cited at immediately
higher speeds (e.g. 11 or 12 m.p.h. over the limit) are not necessarily similar in characteristics with
those cited at 10 m.p.h. over the limit because there remain relatively more non-favored drivers at
those higher speeds.
The second notable feature that stands out is that there are very few tickets below 10 m.p.h.
above the limit. Recall that it is reasonable to imagine that many motorists - considering the higher
probability of getting caught at a higher speed and the higher probability of being involved in a
fatal accident - may have benefit functions due to which they may find it optimal to drive below
10 m.p.h. above the limit once they decide to speed (see Figure 2 in the theory section). Thus we
think that there are few tickets below 10 m.p.h. above the speed limit because officers forgave these
slow speeders or did not even attempt to stop them - due to their stopping and ticketing decisions
captured by Equation (A5) in the Appendix and Equation (5’) in the theory section respectively.
In Figure 1, we overlay a hypothetical distribution of actual speeds. The distribution is graphed
under some reasonable assumptions. We assume that: (1) the distribution should be smooth; (2)
those citations accumulated at the prominent speeds are discounted from some speeds above; (3)
there are few unstopped vehicles above 10.17 We can see that, below 10 m.p.h. above the limit,
there are a substantial number of speeding vehicles that are not even stopped. It seems likely that
the number of completely forgiven or ignored speeding vehicles is larger than the total number of
tickets in our sample.

5.2

Characteristics by Speed

Given our discussion in the previous subsection, in Tables 2 and 3, we examine drivers’ and officers’
characteristics disaggregated by reported speed on tickets. As motivated by our findings in the
previous section, our discussion will focus on those citations at 10 m.p.h. above the limit and its
adjacent speeds.18 If a certain characteristic of drivers or officers is related to the manipulation of
reported speed, we should find a significant discontinuity in that variable around the specific speed.
If officers were strict, different speed levels should only reflect heterogeneity in drivers’ propensity
to speed and, if any, changes in the means over speed should be gradual.
17

According to the 2002 National Survey of Speeding and Other Unsafe Driving Actions conducted by National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration in U.S. Department of Transportation, about 51% of drivers say that they
sometimes or often drive 10 m.p.h. over the speed limit on interstate highways. People believe that they can travel
about 8 m.p.h. over the limit on interstate highways without getting a speeding ticket. Allowable speed margins over
the limit for city or neighborhood streets are deemed slightly lower.
18
One should be careful in interpreting statistics below 10 m.p.h. over the limit given that there are very few
observations.
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Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations of drivers’ characteristics. The column for
the prominent speed (10 m.p.h. above the limit) is highlighted. First, the proportion of in-town
drivers is lower at 10 m.p.h. above the limit. Since there is no reason that in-town drivers drive less
frequently at 10 m.p.h. above the limit than others, it seems reasonable to suppose that officers
are less likely to cite those drivers at that particular speed. This may be due to the fact that
officers tend to give a break to out-of-towners simply because of learning-effects; i.e., they may
be more lenient to out-of-towners since these drivers may not be expected to know the road and
driving conditions as much and consequently could be forgiven for paying more attention to these
conditions than to their speedometers, particularly in the traffic condition of Boston. There is a
similar but weaker pattern for in-state drivers. We also find that the proportion of male drivers
and that of white drivers are higher at the speed, while the proportion of African-American drivers
is lower. This finding suggests the possibility that drivers are treated differently depending on their
gender and race.
Table 3 shows officers’ characteristics over speed. We find significant differences in various
aspects. We find that male and/or inexperienced (or younger) officers are more likely to give a
break to drivers. The most striking difference is found in the proportion of white officers at 10
m.p.h. above the limit. About 70 percent of all the tickets cited at 10 m.p.h. are issued by white
officers, while they account for 40 percent and 30 percent at 9 and 11 m.p.h. above the limit,
respectively. Lastly, note that the proportion of African-American officers is high particularly at 11
and 12 m.p.h. above the limit. This seems to reflect the opposite side of the same coin as the high
proportion of white officers at 10 m.p.h. above the limit. It is reasonable to imagine that there are
relatively more African-American officers at 11 and 12 m.p.h. above the limit because those tickets
issued by white officers, which are supposed to be at 11 or 12 m.p.h. above the limit, are moved to
10 m.p.h. above the limit.

6

Empirical Strategy

Now we consider a statistical model for an officer’s choice of reported speed given that the officer
has already stopped a vehicle and decided to cite the driver. As a starting point, suppose that we
could observe whether the officer gives a driver a break. We can then specify the officer’s propensity
to give a break based on observable characteristics including the officer’s and the driver’s races.
Let yij denote the variable that takes on the value of one if officer j gives a break to driver i and,
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otherwise, takes the value of zero.

 1
yij =
 0

∗ ≥0
if yij
∗ <0
if yij

(6)

∗ = β − β s + c β + C β + L β + {driver race} + {of f icer race} + {racial bias} − ε .
where yij
0
1 i
i 2
j 3
ij 4
ij
∗ represents the officer’s propensity to give a break. The variable s represents
The latent variable yij
i

the driver’s actual speed over the limit that is observed by the officer when the officer stopped the
vehicle. Consistent with an assumption we have made in the theory section, we assume here that the
propensity will be decreasing in si . The vectors ci and Cj include driver and officer characteristics
other than race, respectively. Driver characteristics include age, gender, dummy for in-town drivers,
dummy for in-state drivers, and indicator for commercial license. Officers’ characteristics include
gender and years on the police force. To address the possibility that officers’ leniency varies by
surroundings, the vector Lij includes time, date, and location for tickets; there are three time
dummies (morning, afternoon, and evening, with predawn excluded), six date dummies (Tuesday
excluded), ten neighborhood dummies, and one continuous variable for the speed zone (the speed
limit in m.p.h.). Lastly, the variable εij is a disturbance variable representing what is unobservable
to the econometrician but may influence the officer’s ticketing decision.
To estimate the effects of racial bias on officers’ leniency, we include three sets of dummy
variables created by driver race and officer race. The first set, denoted as {driver race}, includes
two dummy variables, 1[i = a] and 1[i = h], which represent African-American drivers and Hispanic
drivers, respectively. Holding other things, particularly the actual speed si , constant, the coefficients
for these two driver race dummies are intended to capture statistical discrimination or monolithic
racial bias. The first emphasizes the ‘schooling drivers’ aspect: officers may be stricter with drivers
of a specific race if they believe that those drivers will likely speed again when given a warning
or treated leniently. The latter, monolithic racial bias, could be socially imposed: officers may
feel obliged to enforce their chiefs’ or their communities’ racial bias against a particular race. For
example, minority community leaders often call for harsh law enforcement because they are more
easily blamed than whites.
The second set, denoted as {officer race} in Equation (6), also includes two office race dummy
variables 1[j = A] and 1[j = H], which represent African-American officers and Hispanic officers,
respectively. The coefficients for these two dummies should capture officers’ race-specific strictness
(relative to white officers). For example, if African-American officers are strict or less lenient, then
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the corresponding coefficient should be negative.
The final set of dummy variables is denoted as {racial bias}. These variables are supposed to
capture officers’ preferences for drivers with different races, which also may change by officers’ race.
For this purpose, this set should include 6 interaction variables given three racial groups.
W
W
racial bias = dW
w 1[i = w, j = W ] + da 1[i = a, j = W ] + dh 1[i = h, j = W ]
A
A
+dA
w 1[i = w, j = A] + da 1[i = a, j = A] + dh 1[i = h, j = A]
H
H
+dH
w 1[i = w, j = H] + da 1[i = a, j = H] + dh 1[i = h, j = H]

(7)
W
W
W
= 1 + (dW
a − dw )1[i = a, j = W ] + (dh − dw )1[i = h, j = W ]
A
A
A
+1 + (dA
w − da )1[i = w, j = A] + (dh − da )1[i = h, j = A]
H
H
H
+1 + (dH
w − dh )1[i = w, j = H] + (da − dh )1[i = a, j = H]

Te coefficient (dji −djj ) represents the racial bias by officers with race j for drivers with race i against
drivers with officers’ own race j. However, it is not possible to estimate all the six coefficients due to
perfect multicollinearity. It is necessary to impose some reasonable restrictions on parameters (we
can only estimate 4 parameters). For example, AK (forthcoming) imposed the following restrictions:
W
W
W
A
A
A
A
H
H
H
H
dW
a − dw = dh − dw = dw − da = dh − da = dw − dh = da − dh = d.

Therefore,
racial bias = d{1[i = a, j = W ] + 1[i = h, j = W ] + 1[i = w, j = A] + 1[i = h, j = A]

(8)

+1[i = w, j = H] + 1[i = a, j = H]} = dM ismatch,
where Mismatch is a dummy variable for whether the officer’s race and the driver’s race are different.
This is the sum of the above six indicator variables.
The validity of this restriction is an empirical as well as conceptual question; that is, whether,
if any, racial bias occurs in the form of own-race preferences, dji − djj < 0 for all i and j (or
distaste about own-race drivers, dji − djj > 0 for all i and j). In this paper, we allow and test two
more hypothetical forms of racial bias: (1) minority-on-minority bias and (2) African-Americanwhite confrontation. Both hypotheses are motivated by our preliminary scrutiny of the data and the
literature. The first hypothesis is that minority officers are stricter (less lenient) on minority drivers.
Technically, we include the interaction term Minority×Minority, which is 1[i 6= w] × 1[j 6= W ].
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Recall that Dedman and Latour, using the same data set, found that minority officers are tougher
on minority drivers by issuing more tickets than warnings. The latter is that there exists two-way
bias between white and African-American officers, which might be a type of racial bias usually
perceived by the public. Note that these three forms of racial bias (own-race preferences, minorityon-minority bias, and African-American-white confrontation) may coexist. Indeed they are not
mutually exclusive although they might as well compete with each other. Our full specification of
racial bias is the following:
∗ = β − β s + c β + C β + L β + β 1[i = a] + β 1[i = h] + β 1[j = A] + β 1[j = H]
yij
0
1 i
i 2
j 3
ij 4
5
6
7
8

+d1 M ismatch + d2 M inority × M inority + d3 1[i = a, j = W ] + d4 1[i = w, j = A] − εij
(9)

6.1

Warnings versus Tickets

An obvious measure of officers’ leniency is whether they give warnings rather than tickets given
a level of speed. In Table 4, we estimate the Probit model where the dependent variable is the
indicator for whether the driver is warned rather than ticketed. Here we assume that the reported
speed is the actual speed, which is not true and will be discussed later.19 Note, however, that
the main purpose of this subsection is to compare our analysis with the Boston Globe’s analysis
presented in Column (1). We try to replicate the regression analysis done by Professor Elaine
I. Allen which was asked by the Boston Globe. Although the samples and specifications are not
exactly identical, our findings are overall in harmony with the Boston Globe’s: officers are stricter
for faster drivers; white, older drivers, and/or in-town drivers are more likely to be warned; male
drivers are less likely to be warned.
In Column (2), we include our racial bias terms as well as other control variables as specified
in Equation (9). Some results become different from the Boston Globe’s. We find that the driver
age effect is nonlinear: officers are more lenient for younger and older drivers while they are strict
for prime age drivers. We find no gender disparity.
More importantly for our purpose in this paper, we find that officer characteristics are significant: male and/or less experienced officers are more lenient. Given a cited speed and holding other
things constant, they are more likely to issue warnings instead of tickets. The racial bias terms
19

We can minimize this problem by using a series of dummy variables for speed ranges (such as below 10, 10-14,
and 15 or above) instead of using the continuous variable. This solution is reasonable in that the speed is discounted
to its nearest prominent level. Our results change little by using dummy variables for speed ranges.
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are also significant. Our full specification in Column (2) shows that minority officers are stricter to
minority drivers. In other words, minority drivers are more likely to be warned and not ticketed
when they are stopped by white officers. This is consistent with Dedman and Latour’s articles.

6.2

Reported Speed

Now we allow the possibility that officers manipulate the speed on tickets. The actual speed is not
observable to the econometrician. Thus we assume that:
si = Xi α1 + Li α2 + α3 1[i = a] + α4 1[i = h] + ωi

(10)

where the vector Xi includes the driver’s characteristics affecting speeding behavior. The vector Li
is the same as defined in Equation (6). The coefficient α3 and α4 are supposed to capture average
racial differentials in speeding behavior. Depending on the driver’s race, the maximum speed at
which he or she can drive - s̃(c, r) in our theoretical model - may differ.20 In addition, drivers of
different races may have different perceptions regarding their likelihood they will be ticketed - Eγ
in our theoretical model. The variable ωi represents unobservable individual heterogeneity such as,
among others, risk attitude and time discount.
One noteworthy thing is that there is no officer variable included in Equation (7) because it is
unknown to the driver which type of officer s/he will encounter when s/he is stopped. Also note
that we include location variables controlling which neighborhood the motorist was driving through.
The path the driver follows is clearly his/her choice, and if officers are assigned across districts in a
systematic way based on their observable types (e.g., race) and if drivers know this assignment rule,
the driver may be able to predict to some extent which type of officers he or she will likely face on
their path. For example, people might expect more African-American officers in a neighborhood in
which African-Americans are concentrated (AK, forthcoming). While this expectation should be
expected to affect speeding behavior or route choice for criminals (or those who try to avoid police
stops, e.g. joyriders), it should not for other types of motorists. First, it should be quite costly, in
terms of both time and gasoline, to change their route given their origin and destination. Again we
believe that those drivers within our focused range of speed, 10-14 m.p.h. above the limit, should
not choose their travel route in order to avoid certain types of officers.
Drivers’ characteristics that affect officers’ leniency could affect drivers’ speeding behavior. To
20

Surprisingly there is little empirical research on drivers’ race and speeding. But we believe that speeding behavior
should not be significantly different by drivers’ race within our narrow range of speed, 10-14 m.p.h. above the limit.
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be general, we do not assume any exclusion restriction; ci = Xi . For example, the driver’s age
should not only determine the speeding behavior but also affect the likelihood that he or she gets
a break from the officer who stops him/her. Old drivers tend to drive slowly while officers tend to
give a break to them. Under the assumptions, substituting Equation (7), we have:
∗ = β − β (α + c α + Λ α + α 1[i = a] + α 1[i = h] + ω )
yij
0
1 0
i 1
i 2
3
4
i

+ci β2 + Cj β3 + Λij β4 + β5 1[i = a] + β6 1[i = h] + β7 1[j = A] + β8 1[j = H]
+d1 M ismatch + d2 M inority × M inority + d3 1[i = a, j = W ] + d4 1[i = w, j = A] − εij

= (β0 − β1 α0 ) + ci (β2 − β1 α1 ) + Cj β3 + Λij (β4 − β1 α2 )
+(β5 − β1 α3 )1[i = a] + (β6 − β1 α4 )1[i = h] + β7 1[j = A] + β8 1[j = H]
+d1 M ismatch + d2 M inority × M inority + d3 1[i = a, j = W ] + d4 1[i = w, j = A] − (εij + β1 ωi )
(11)
It is obvious in Equation (11) that we cannot identify the coefficients for officers’ statistical discrimination or monolithic preferences because drivers’ race also possibly matters in their speeding
behavior. On the other hand, we can still identify officers’ race-specific strictness and, more importantly, can test for different types of racial bias: own-race preferences, minority-on-minority bias,
and African-American-white confrontation.
We do not directly observe officers’ choice of whether or not to give a break. Thus, we use a
proxy variable, an indicator as to whether a motorist is cited for driving exactly 10 m.p.h. above
the limit. The use of the proxy variable is well rationalized from our discussion in previous sections.
The variable is, however, subject to misclassification error. For example, those drivers whose actual
speed is 10 m.p.h. above the limit and whose speed gets cited at exactly 10 m.p.h. above the limit
are classified as those who are favored by officers although they actually are not.21 Misclassification
error is likely to lead to attenuation bias.
As mentioned before, we restrict our sample to tickets between 10 and 14 m.p.h. over the
speed limit. Due to the massive spike at 10 m.p.h. above the limit, the restricted sample includes
the majority of tickets (55%) in our whole sample. This sample restriction will reduce drivers’
heterogeneity. Since our purpose is to identify officers’ discretionary behavior and racial bias
as distinctly as possible, we want to minimize drivers’ heterogeneity and remove the potentially
21
There is another misclassified group in which drivers get cited above 10 m.p.h. over the limit while they drive
faster than that. We believe that there are only a negligible number of tickets in that category because officers would
rather cite 10 m.p.h. above the limit (than 11 or 12) once they have decided to give a break.
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confounding effects. It is also reasonable to assume that officers are less likely to give a break (or
likely to give a smaller break) to motorists driving 15 m.p.h. or faster above the limit (recall our
assumption in the theory section that “the reported speed will be increasing in si beyond a certain
speed” is to that effect). Slow speeders driving below 10 m.p.h. over the limit are either not even
stopped or strictly given a ticket since they are more likely to violate the speed limit in a restricted
zone (such as school zone). In either case, officers’ manipulation of speed on tickets should be
expected to be insignificant. The range of speed between 10 and 14 m.p.h. over the limit seems to
be appropriate for the study of leniency in terms of speed discounting.
The restriction potentially raises sample selection bias because we drop those tickets whose
actual speed is between 10 and 14 m.p.h. above the limit but it is reported below 10 m.p.h. The
bias is likely to be ignorable given that there are very few tickets cited under 10 m.p.h. over the
limit; in addition, - as mentioned before - citing a speed at or below 10 m.p.h. above the speed limit
does not matter for the motorist or the officer in Massachusetts in any way. Finally, although there
are also some observable spikes at multiples of 5 above 14 m.p.h. over the limit, the magnitude of
underreporting should be weak for drivers who are driving above 15 m.p.h. over the limit.

7

Empirical Findings

Table 5 presents our main results from the Probit model.22 The dependent variable is the indicator
for whether drivers get cited for driving exactly at 10 m.p.h. over the limit. We include all
three sets of variables for the racial bias, Mismatch, M inority × M inority (1[i 6= w]1[j 6= W ]),
1[i = a, j = W ], and 1[i = w, j = A]. In Column (1), as discussed before, we use our sample of
tickets between 10 and 14 m.p.h. over the limit. In Column (2), we restrict the sample further to
those between 10 and 11 m.p.h. above the limit. In this extremely limited sample, it seems to be
true that whether they drive at 10 or 11 m.p.h. above the limit is not systematically determined by
their characteristics. Therefore, any significant effect we find in this sample should be attributed
to officers’ manipulation - due to discretionary or racial reasons. The results are strikingly similar
between the two samples.
22
An alternative specification is a zero-inflated Poisson model, which can allow for different data-generating processes, one for exactly 10 m.p.h. over the limit and another for higher speeds. The results are similar.
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7.1

Driver Characteristics

As determinants of whether drivers get cited for driving exactly 10 m.p.h. over the limit, we
include driver characteristics such as age, gender, whether the driver resides in the same town where
he/she is stopped, whether he/she resides in Massachusetts, and whether he/she holds a commercial
driver’s license. We find that no such driver characteristic variable is significant, except for race. As
shown in Equation (11), we cannot differentiate the direct influence of any driver characteristic on
the officer’s ticketing decision from its effect on the actual speed and its subsequent impact on the
officer’s decision. The two effects might be opposite, which is perhaps why our driver characteristics
turn out to be insignificant. In addition, the insignificance of driver characteristics variables might
result from our limited range of speed. It is not surprising that drivers’ characteristics do not
determine the speeding behavior in a range between 10 and 14 m.p.h. above the limit (needless to
say, the range between 10 and 11 m.p.h. above the limit).
One exception is the number of violations which significantly decreases the likelihood in which
drivers get cited for driving exactly at 10 m.p.h. over the limit. First, officers could be tougher on
those speeders who also violates the baby car seat rule. This variable may be also related to the
driver’s behavior. The drivers without appropriate registration would refrain from speeding. On
the contrary, it might be equally true that drunken drivers would be more likely to speed due to
the influence of alcohol.

7.2

Officer Characteristics

Unlike driver characteristics, most of officer characteristics variables are significant in explaining
why some drivers get cited at 10 m.p.h. above the limit while others do not. First of all, we find
that male officers are significantly more likely to issue tickets at 10 m.p.h. above the limit. This
suggests that male officers are more lenient than female officers. At the sample averages of the
other variables, male officers are 33% (or 19% in Column (2)) more likely to give a break than
female officers. Second, less experienced or young officers are more likely to give a break to drivers
than experienced officers. It seems reasonable that new officers are more lenient since - especially
during this crucial learning-by-doing process of theirs in which they pay attention to all aspects
of becoming a full-fledged officer - they may be more vulnerable to many things including drivers’
complaints. Also they might be not as deft at handling speeders as their seniors.
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7.3

Interactions Between Driver Races and Officer Races

Like other driver characteristics, we find no significant effect for driver race. However, keep in mind
that we cannot differentiate between the direct effect of driver race on the officer’s ticketing decision
or its effect on the actual speed and its subsequent impact on the officer’s decision. On the other
hand, officer race variables are significant. We find that relative to white officers, African-American
and Hispanic officers are significantly less likely to give a break. On average, holding other things
constant, African-American (or Hispanic officers) are about 13% (or 9%) less likely to give a break.
The variable Mismatch is significant when it is included alone. However, as soon as we include Minority×Minority, Mismatch turns out to be insignificant. This means that the significant
result for Mismatch is driven by minority officers being tough on minority drivers. We find that
Minority×Minority is significant. Minority officers are 16% (or 8% in Column (2)) less likely to be
lenient to minority drivers. We additionally find that African-American officers are less lenient to
white drivers. Combined with the previous finding that minority officers are tougher on minority
drivers, the last finding shows that African-American officers are stricter to all races of drivers than
other officers while they are slightly more stricter to minority drivers.

7.4

Validity Check of Identification Strategy and Robustness Check

In Table 6, in Column (1), we restrict our sample to those between 11 and 14 m.p.h. above the
limit. The dependent variable is the indicator for whether drivers get cited for driving exactly at 11
m.p.h. above the limit. We call this kind of dependent variable “fake” dependent variable since it
seems unlikely from the data that officers cite drivers at 11 m.p.h. rather than 12, 13, or 14 m.p.h.
above the limit. In fact, an officer might look too meticulous when he decides to give a break to
a driver and lowers the reported speed from 14 to 11 m.p.h. over the limit. The purpose of this
subsection is to check the validity of our identification strategy of using 10 m.p.h. over the limit as
a proxy variable for officers’ leniency.
The results support our empirical strategy. Using fake dependent variables, all the racial bias
variables except one become insignificant. Only the variable for African-American officers is significant and positive. This is in fact the indirect consequence of the racial bias found at 10 m.p.h.
above the limit. Recall that in Table 5 we find that African-American officers are the least lenient.
As white and Hispanic officers discount tickets that should be cited at a speed higher than 10 m.p.h.
over the limit and less than 15 m.p.h. over the limit and, in fact, cite 10 m.p.h. above the limit, it
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is a natural consequence of it to find out that there are relatively more African-American officers
citing speeds at 11 and 12 m.p.h. over the limit.
Also note that the effect of speed limit is significantly positive in Table 6 while it is significantly
negative in Table 5. Given that our results in Table 6 are driven by drivers’ behavior rather than
officers’ behavior, this contrasting finding suggests that the negative effect we found in Table 5
is a result of officers’ discretionary behavior of speed reporting. We conclude that holding the
actual speed constant, officers are less likely to give a break to those who speed in a high speed
zone. This has a reasonable explanation: the officers in general deem that high speed in itself is
a dangerous and risky act and should be curbed more as the speed the motorists are allowed to
travel at increases.
Likewise we can also check if our findings in Table 5 regarding driver characteristics and time
and location variables result from drivers’ speeding behavior or officers’ discretionary manipulation
of the speed. First, in Table 6, there is no significant effect of the number of violations, which
means that what we found in Table 5 is the consequence of officers’ discretionary behavior. Second,
with the fake dependent variables, we find no systematic effect of dates or time of the day. When
significant, they are positive. On the contrary, we found in Table 5 the negative effects of those
variables. This also suggests that officers do manipulate the reported speed differently according
to time and date.
For further robustness check, in Table 7, in Columns (1) and (2), we restrict our sample to
those speeding tickets issued while there was no vehicle search. One might think that officers would
behave differently when drivers look suspicious. In addition, on the driver’s side, speeding behavior
and criminal activities could be correlated. The results change little. There is a significant effect
of Minority×Minority.
In Columns (3) and (4), we disaggregate the minority group since one may think that AfricanAmerican and Hispanic officers have different incentives and preferences. We include four interaction terms between African-American/Hispanic officers and drivers instead of Minority×Minority.
Unfortunately, we cannot test for own-race preferences and African-American and white reciprocal bias because we can only estimate up to four parameters. This should not be a major issue
since the variables except 1[i = w, j = A] were insignificant in Table 5. The results show that
African-American and Hispanic officers do have different preferences; the magnitude of bias against
minority drivers is larger among Hispanic officers. However, minority officers do not differentially
treat African-American and Hispanic drivers.
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Finally, we check the possibility of overreporting, although we believe that overreporting should
not be very common because it could irritate drivers for no explicit benefit to officers. We replicate
our main analysis in Table 5 using the new sample of those tickets cited at 10 m.p.h. over the limit
and below. The idea is that if our previous results were driven by officers’ overreporting rather
than underreporting, we should find the same and even stronger results with the correct sample and
specification. The results in Column (5) show that those who are cited at 10 m.p.h. over the limit
are more likely to be white drivers and cited by white officers compared to those cited below the
speed. It is not surprising given the racial composition of drivers and officers over different speed
levels in Tables 2 and 3. The most important finding here is that there is no evidence for racial
bias; none of racial interaction terms is significant. We conclude that although we still cannot fully
exclude the possibility of overreporting, if any, it should not be motivated by racial bias. In other
words, overreporting cannot explain our previous finding about minority-on-minority bias.

7.5

Differences across Subsamples

Table 8 compares the results across different subsamples: by time of day in Column (1), by driver’s
gender in Column (2), by driver’s age in Column (3), and by vehicle age in Column (4). The variable
Minority×Minority is significant for both day and night. Interestingly, the effect is stronger at night.
And, at night, the variable for African-American drivers turns out to be positive and significant. In
combination with the stop-and-search literature’s findings, this may reflect an after-the-fact leniency
shown to these drivers who may initially be considered as a higher statistical criminal threat by
officers, right after they stop such drivers; once officers figure out - one way or another – that many
of such drivers are not carrying any contraband, the leniency may be a form of implicit reward to
such non-criminal African-American drivers. Also, only at night, African-American officers are less
lenient to white drivers; this may be either due to the fact that white drivers that drive at night
have different characteristics that are unobservable to the econometrician - such as fewer older
looking white drivers might be driving at night.
In addition, we find that minority officers are less lenient to minority drivers in the context of
male drivers while there is no evidence for minority-on-minority bias in the case of female drivers.
The bias exists regardless of driver age, while it does not exist for relatively new vehicles.
Table 9 shows the results for different racial neighborhoods. It may matter in what kind of neighborhood an officer stops and tickets a driver. This additional feature can easily be incorporated into
our theoretical setup by employing an additional neighborhood notation, N ∈ {AA, W H} where
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AA and WH stand for predominantly African-American and white neighborhoods respectively,
and so on). As mentioned in the empirical predictions section, one can imagine that an officer’s
integrity marginal cost is higher in a neighborhood more populated with people of his own race;
A
tA
r (AA) > tr (W H)

and

W
tW
r (W H) > tr (AA)

In Column (1) we focus on white neighborhoods (60% or more white) and find no evidence for
the racial bias. We still find that African-American officers are the least lenient followed by Hispanic
officers. In Column (2) we look at African-American neighborhoods where 20% or more population
is African-American. We find that, in this area, minority officers are less lenient to minority
drivers. In addition we find that African-American officers are less lenient to white drivers. Lastly,
in Column (3) where we examine Hispanic neighborhoods, we find no significant effect of any race
variables. The insignificance might result from small sample size.

7.6

Traffic Fines

As a supplementary study, in this subsection, we examine whether police officers also manipulate
the dollar amount of a fine directly. The question is motivated by Makowsky and Stratmann
(forthcoming) which shows that fines are somewhat arbitrarily determined by officers according to
their own objectives or local public interests. Information on the fine amount is also available in
our data since officers were required to record the exact dollar amount as well as vehicle speed.

 pij − p(σij )
Gap =
 0

if pij is reported

(12)

if pij is missing

By using Equation (12), we compute the gap between the fine amount written on a ticket (pij )
and that calculated by the formula and the reported speed - p(σij ) = 75 + 10(σij − 10) when the
reported speed exceeds 10 m.p.h. above the speed limit and $75 otherwise. Surprisingly, the fine
amount is missing for about 44 percent of 25,738 tickets. Instead of dropping these observations, we
assume that the amount should have been calculated by the formula and impute it by the formula
and the reported speed. This assumption is reasonable in that there is no particular reason why
something other than the amount implied by the formula should be imposed when a ticket with
missing fine is sent to the collection office. When the fine amount is missing, by construction, the
gap is zero.
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Table 10 presents the distribution of the fine gap. We continue to use our restricted sample of
tickets between 10 and 14 m.p.h. above the speed limit.23 There are three noteworthy things in
Table 10. First, it is notable that the gap is zero for 89 percent of tickets. This means that officers
rarely lower fines and tend to apply the formula strictly. This is in contrast with our previous
finding that officers are lenient in terms of speed reporting. This makes sense in that officers do
not want to look “inconsistent” by reporting a penalty different from what the reported speed
implies. Second, there is an accumulation (3%) of tickets at $25. This is probably due to the fact
that officers omit the surcharge of $25 for the Head Injury Trust Fund. In this case, we should
not interpret the gap as evidence that officers lower fines. Third, a tiny number of tickets have
negative gaps; officers impose larger fines than the recommended fine according to the statute. This
is possible in special zones like construction site.
Table 11 presents the results from Tobit models where the dependent variable is the fine gap. In
Column (2) we exclude those tickets whose fine gap is exactly $25 because of the above mentioned
concern. There are some significant estimates. First, the higher the speed limit is, the larger the
fine gap is. The size of the effect is, however, small. A 10 m.p.h. increase in the speed limit on
average increases the gap by 50 to 80 cents. Second, the gap is larger for younger drivers. Again
the effect is not substantial. The negative effect of driver age seems to reflect the notion that
officers are less lenient to prime-age adults with higher earning potential. It might indicate that
officers’ penalty policy is overall progressive or simply that officers have certain age preferences.
Third, we find a similar negative (and small) effect for commercial drivers. This too may be due
to the fact that officers may tend give a break to less experienced drivers such as non-commercial
drivers. Fourth, officers’ experience increases the fine gap. This is opposite to our previous finding
that inexperienced officers are more lenient. A plausible explanation is that these younger and
newer officers are more concerned about inconsistency between the fine and reported speed. We
also find significant effects of time of the day, but the estimates between Columns (1) and (2) are
too different to interpret appropriately.
We also find that minority officers give smaller fines. Compared to white officers, the gap is
larger by $1.8 for African-American officers and by $4 for Hispanic officers. Like other significant
estimates, the size of the effect is not substantial. Furthermore, these differences disappear after
we drop those tickets with the $25 gap in Column (2). More importantly, we find that none of the
23
In addition, we focus on tickets without additional violation other than speeding in order to impute the fine
amount accurately where it is missing.
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racial bias variables is significant in both samples. The conclusion is that racial bias occurs mostly
when officers decide which speed to report. Once they decide on the speed, there seems no further
racial consideration in deciding fines.

8

Concluding Remarks

Our theoretical section considered motorists who take into account the probability of getting ticketed and the speed that the officer will cite in deciding at what speed they will travel and officers
who - net of the cost of ticketing motorists - maximize a benefit function which generically increases in the speed of ticketed drivers; this framework is general enough to allow officers to give
some drivers a break by citing them at a lower speed than they were traveling.
In our empirical section, we exploit the existence of a massive accumulation of speeding tickets
exactly at 10 m.p.h. over the speed limit to elicit officers’ discretionary behavior and leniency. We
show that the accumulation of tickets at the specific speed level is likely to result from officers’
manipulation of reported speed – underreporting. Using our novel measure of officers’ leniency,
we find that white officers are the most lenient ones overall. Female officers are the least lenient
group of officers. We find strong evidence that minority officers are less lenient to minority drivers.
There is no minority-on-minority bias when vehicles are new and/or when drivers are female. The
bias, on the other hand, gets stronger at night and/or in minority concentration neighborhoods.
Although we find evidence of racial bias, we find no systematic racial bias in the form of mutual or
monolithic racial bias. Our findings about minority-on-minority bias are interesting particularly in
that AK (forthcoming), using the same data set, found evidence on own-race preferences in vehicle
searches.
In the next few paragraphs we will attempt to reconcile well-established sociological - and
other - perspectives and our two findings that (1) there is minority-to-minority bias and (2) female
officers are relatively stricter. On the sociological front, we first note an observation by Weber
(1968) that a social group’s superior material resources relative to another group can give rise to
the development of status beliefs favoring that group over the other. Further, a wide variety of
historical contingencies can also help such status beliefs. Once such beliefs form, a member of the
materially-disadvantaged group suffers a social disadvantage even vis-à-vis those members of the
other group who are, in fact, his or her material equals.
In addition, recently there have been attempts to explain how bias against minorities may arise
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in the context of network structure of social interactions and categorizations, which influence the
formation of status beliefs. Fiske (1993) has shown that people tend to more finely categorize
groups who are above them in a hierarchy and more coarsely categorize groups who are below them
in a hierarchy. Furthermore, types of experiences and groups of people that are less frequent in the
population are more coarsely categorized and more often lumped together. As a result, this can
give rise to bias against minority groups even when there is no malevolent taste for bias (Fryer and
Jackson, 2008).
When, along with the above sociological perspectives, one uses further research by sociologists
- as well as by anthropologists and psychologists - observing American children at play, one may be
able to shed even more light on our two findings emphasized above. In that strand of research, it is
found that girls tend to play in small groups (or with a single best friend) and“learn to downplay
ways in which one is better than the others and to emphasize ways in which they are all the same.”
Boys, on the other hand, tend to play in larger groups in which they are not treated as equals.
“Boys generally don’t accuse one another of being bossy, because the leader is expected to tell
lower-status boys what to do” (Tannen, 2001).
In the light of the contents of the last few paragraphs, one can imagine a typical police department which is populated by mostly white officers. Accordingly, in such a police department, a
status- or bias-formation process in the eyes of (especially newly-hired) male-minority officers may
develop more or less along the lines of the above-mentioned Weberian and network-based sociological theories - many of these officers may perceive that their chances of surviving in that department
could be increased if they reflected these status-differential beliefs in their behavior, while groups
of male-minority officers may also be mutually guilty of coarsely categorizing the other minority
groups that they encounter less frequently and do not particularly categorize above themselves
in a hierarchy. While white-male officers may not share these perspectives of the male-minority
officers, they could be involved in various types of non-racial discretionary behavior simply due
to their unwillingness to perceive all drivers as equals. Female officers, on the other hand, may
downplay any such status inequalities and treat all drivers as equals - as explained by the above
gender differences that start developing at childhood. Surely, elaborate - and inter-disciplinary future research would be very useful in substantiating this section’s attempts to reconcile our two
above-mentioned empirical findings and various prominent behavioral perspectives.
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A

Appendix

A.1

Ruling out some simple driver benefit functions

Suppose the variable benefit function is such that the marginal benefit is declining beyond the limit.
Then it is easy to observe that the driver will only drive at speeds less than 10 m.p.h. above the
limit since the penalty function will be increasing beyond 10 m.p.h. above the limit. Next, consider
the variable benefit function, v(s, c) = a0 , where a0 > 0. Then note that, even if Eγ = 0, (i) there
will be no speeding if α > a0 , (ii) any speed between the limit and 10 m.p.h. above the limit would
be possible if α = a0 , and (iii) the driver would never exceed a speed which is 10 m.p.h. above the
limit if α < a0 .
Thus, to generate any speeds especially beyond 10 m.p.h. above the limit, we need to assume
that at least a group of drivers will have a variable benefit function with increasing marginal benefit
in some range of speeds exceeding the limit by 10 m.p.h. A possible tractable - though unrealistic
- candidate for such a benefit function would be the linear form
v(s, c) = a0 + a1 s,

(A1)

a0 > 0 is the level of benefit at the speed limit and a1 > 0 is the marginal benefit of speeding
beyond the limit Note that if a0 > α and a1 > 10, then the optimal speed is ∞ at low levels of Eγ.
With a0 > α and a1 < 10, optimizing behavior yields
(1 − Eγ)/Eγ = a1 /10.

(A2)

Note that this condition does not allow the driver to pick a particular optimal speed. Examining
this condition a little closer reveals that the driver will definitely be speeding but will be indifferent
among all speeds exceeding the limit by 10 m.p.h. as long as
(1 − Eγ)/Eγ > a1 /10.

(A3)

Further, the driver is indifferent between any speed above the limit by 10 miles as well as not
speeding at all as long as
(1 − Eγ)/Eγ = a1 /10,

(A4)

Thus, the driver will randomize over any speed exceeding the limit by ten miles as well as
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speeding at or below the limit. In addition, the marginal benefit of speeding staying constant at
each speed is surely far from describing a plausible and realistic situation.

A.2

Personal variations on the driver benefit function

Assume that there are n > 1 different segments of motorists with different levels of benefits at
speeds exceeding the speed limit. Using the following driver variable benefit function will allow
such personal variations regarding the drivers’ taste for speeding, where θi , λi > 0 with: vi (s, c) =
a0 + θi s̃(c, r)s − λi s2 such that θn > θn−1 > ... > θ1 > 0 and 0 < λn < λn−1 < ... < λ1 , i= 1, 2,
. . . , n. Given any utility function, if the driver chooses to speed, the optimizing behavior yields
³
´
zEγ
speeding s∗ miles above the speed limit: s∗r (c, z, γ) = 2λ1 i θi s̃(c, r) − k (1−zEγ)
. Thus, θn /λn ≤ 2
is implied so that the “maximum speed s∗ chosen by a driver when γ = 0” cannot possibly exceed
s̃(c, r). Note that a very low θ1 and a very high λ1 may allow the presence of a segment of drivers
who would not speed even when γ is very low (especially if a0 is also sufficiently low or zero).

A.3

Personal variations on officers’ types

Again, here too, to allow personal variations one can assume that there are m > 1 different segments
of officers by re-scaling tR
r via a parameter τi > 0, where i = 1, 2, ..., m. This will allow us - among
other possibilities - to consider real-life cases where different segments of officers using prominent
speed-cutoff probabilities such as 10 or 15 miles above the limit before they would consider issuing
a ticket, and so on.

A.4

The stopping decision

The stopping decision (which is unobservable to the econometrician) is typically made in the absence
of any information about c as well as about r. There is the time cost of stopping a driver, , separate
from the ticketing cost t. Let the set below, (c∗ , r∗ |s), denote the set of driver types whose ticketing
- when stopped at speed (s) - would yield a non-negative payoff to the officer of type (C, R).
(c∗ , r∗ |s) =

½
µ
¶
¾
∗
∗
R s−σ
(c, r) : bR
(σ
,
s,
c|C)
−
t
−
t
≥
0
.
r
r
s

That is, a police officer, upon stopping a driver, will ticket her if and only if his ticketing net benefit
is non-negative. Note that (c, r) cannot be observed by the officer before he makes the stop. Let
F (c|w, s) and F (c|a, s) be the distribution of c in the white and African-American populations,
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respectively, conditional on observed speed s. Let G(r|s) be the probability that the driver who is
stopped turns out to be of race rconditional on s. Let B(c∗ , r∗ |C, R, s), denote the expected net
benefit of an officer of type (C, R) from ticketing a driver of type (c∗ , r∗ |s) - who is stopped at
speed (s) - by citing her speed at (σ ∗ ):
µ
¶¶
¸
∗
X ·Z µ
R ∗
R s−σ
br (σ , s, c|C) − tr
B(c , r |C, R, s) =
F (c|r, s)dc G(r|s) − t,
s
r=w,a
∗

∗

such that (c, r) ∈ (c∗ , r∗ |s). Once the officer observes a vehicle speeding at speed (s), he compares
his stopping cost T to it to choose the probability β of stopping that motorist.
B(c∗ , r∗ |C, R, s) − T.

(A5)

Equation (A5) implies the following. If the term in (A5) is positive, the optimizing behavior
implies β(C, R, s) = 1. If that term is negative, then the optimizing behavior implies β(C, R, s) = 0.
If that term is zero, then the officer will be willing to randomize over whether or not to stop a
motorist traveling at speed s.
T may be expected to be fully idiosyncratic. However, there is a lot of anecdotal evidence that
many officers set their radar guns to beep at certain focal speed levels such as 10 m.p.h. above
the speed limit. The generic explanation by Albers and Albers (1983) seems to be relevant here as
well.
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